Silence Gives Consent by Jessup, Phillip C
SILENCE GIVES CONSENT
Phillip C. Jessup*
Procedural details are seldom dramatic and sometimes dull, yet no
lawyer ignores their importance. In international institutions they take
on a special significance because procedures, whether judicial or parlia-
mentary, vary widely from country to country. This often produces a
situation where the enforcement of an unknown foreign rule may be
considered a bit of trickery. Robert's Rules have had wide influence but
have never been adopted en bloc by an international convention.,
During the twenty-fifth anniversary sessions of the United Nations
General Assembly, there was an extensive debate in the Sixth (Legal)
Committee on the role of the International Court of Justice. Speaker
after speaker referred to some of the procedural difficulties of the Court.
The reasons for existing Rules of Court-and their application in partic-
ular cases-are not always appreciated, but the "law's delays" are on
record. Many of the speakers noted with appreciation the fact that the
Court itself now has a Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
although it is not always realized that this study began several years ago
and had reached an advanced stage of preparation even before the last
elections to the Court in 1969.
These comments will not deal, however, with the International Court
of Justice, but rather they will consider some procedural innovations in
the political organs of the United Nations.
The Charter of the United Nations itself deals with various proce-
dural questions. Article 18 provides that: "Decisions of the General
Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds major-
ity of the members present and voting." 2 While examples of such ques-
tions are given in the article, a familiar example which highlights the
importance of article 18 is furnished by the question of the seating of
the delegates of the People's Republic of China. The preliminary battle
was fought over a resolution that the question be considered "impor-
tant." Only a simple majority is necessary to carry a resolution denomi-
nating the substantive issue as an "important question." However, once
labeled an "important question," a two-thirds majority is required on
the substantive issue. Of course, if the question is not first designated
*Judge, International Court of Justice, 1961-70. United States Representative to UN General
Assembly, 1943-52; Ambassador at Large 1949-53; Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law
and Diplomacy, Columbia University, 1946-61.
'See Jessup, Parliamentary Diplomacy, 89 RECUEIL DES COURS 185 (1956).
2U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 2.
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"important," as was the case in the seating of the delegates of the
People's Republic of China, a simple majority is all that is necessary to
carry a resolution on the substantive question. Similarly, a draft resolu-
tion may carry in one of the principal committees only to fail to attain
the requisite majority in the plenary session. (The failure may result
either from application of the two-thirds rule or from a decision by the
head of the delegation to overrule the vote cast by the member of his
delegation sitting in the committee.)
Other innovations in procedure are contained in the familiar provi-
sions of article 27 of the Charter which provide:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring
votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute
shall abstain from voting.3
The necessity for securing the concurring votes of the five permanent
members creates what is known as the right to veto. The procedural
manipulations of this rule lead to the problem of the "double veto"
which needs no reexamination here.' It should also be noted that if one
wants to avoid casting a veto and is sure of the positions of other
delegations, a resolution can be defeated by seven abstentions.5
Importance has been attached to the size and nature of the majority
supporting resolutions of the General Assembly; it has been suggested
that this has a bearing on the legal or legislative weight of the resolu-
tion.' Leaving that argument to one side, it may still be true that the
influence and indeed the legal effect of a resolution of the General
Assembly may be a function of the nature of the vote. If a resolution is
adopted unanimously, it has special weight. If the vote includes substan-
tial representation of all three "worlds," it is more persuasive than if
adopted by the vote of those delegates who are associated with only one
or another group of states. The present writer touched on this problem
in his dissenting opinion in the South West Africa cases:
Since, as I have explained, I believe the judicial task of the Court
3U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
'For a discussion of the use of the veto power, see L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS (2d ed. 1949).
'U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
'Southwest Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 291 (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
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in interpreting Article 2 of the Mandate, is to be performed by apply-
ing appropriate objective standards-as, in other contexts, courts both
international and national have done-it is not necessary for me to
enter here into the meaning of a legal "norm" either as the term
appears to have been used in the pleadings in this case, or with one or
more of the connotations to be found in jurisprudential literature. This
section of the opinion has shown that the standard to be applied by
the Court must be one which takes account of the views and attitudes
of the contemporary international community. This is not the same
problem as proving the establishment of a rule of customary interna-
tional law, and I have already explained that I do not accept Appli-
cants' alternative plea which would test the apartheid policy against
an assumed rule of international law ("norm"). It is therefore not
necessary to discuss here whether unanimity is essential to the exis-
tence of communis opinio juris. It has also been plainjy stated herein
that my conclusion does not rest upon the thesis that resolutions of the
General Assembly have a general legislative character and by them-
selves create new rules of law. But the accumulation of expressions of
condemnation of apartheid as reproduced in the pleadings of Appli-
cants in this case, especially as recorded in the resolutions of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations, are proof of the pertinent con-
temporary international community standard. Counsel for Respon-
dent, in another connection, agreed that "the effect of obtaining the
agreement of an organization like the United Nations would, for all
practical purposes, be the same as obtaining the consent of all the
members individually, and that would probably be of decisive practical
value," for the United Nations "represents most of the civilized States
of the world." (C.R. 65/15, p. 28.) It is equally true that obtaining the
disagreement, the condemnation of the United Nations, is of decisive
practical-and juridical-value in determining the applicable stan-
dard. This Court is bound to take account of such a consensus as
providing the standard to be used in the interpretation of Article 2 of
the Mandate.7
Electric voting machines have accelerated voting procedures in the
plenary sessions of the General Assembly. In addition, the United Na-
tions has recently experienced an encouraging tendency to obtain a
result or a conclusion without the need for a strictly formal vote. Some-
times the practice reflects the skill of a presiding officer building on the
eagerness of the delegations to move along toward adjournment. For
some time, the President of the General Assembly has utilized the prin-
ciple that "silence gives consent," but only in rather obvious cases. For
7Southwest Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 441 (Jessup, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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example, in the 1927th meeting of the General Assembly one non-
controversial item was efficiently handled as follows:
AGENDA ITEM 14.
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
(A/8005)
The PRESIDENT: The next item relates to the report of the In-
ternational Court of Justice for the period from I August 1969 to 31
July 1970. Document A/8005.
If no representative wishes to speak, I propose that the General
Assembly take note of the report of the International Court of Justice.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT.: We have thus concluded consideration of
agenda item 14.8
Additional efforts to reform procedures in the General Assembly are
continuing. Responding to Canada's proposed inclusion on the twenty-
fifth session agenda of an item entitled "Rationalization of the Proce-
dures and Organization of the General Assembly," the General Assem-
bly created a Special Committee to study the problem' The Security
Council has adopted a traditionally Asian practice which, oddly enough,
was also employed at Quaker meetings-action by "consensus." A simi-
lar practice is followed in NATO where unanimity is essential and it is
futile to say a point is agreed upon if it is not. Such a consensus requires
no vote; the chairman simply finds that it exists.
As early as 1946 the President of the Security Council used the con-
sensus technique in dealing with a complaint by the Soviet Union
against the presence of British troops in Greece. He spoke of the "sense
of the Council" and later read a statement which had been prepared by
the Soviet Union and the United States and announced that the Council
considered the matter closed." The Representative of the Soviet Union,
as President of the Security Council, was apparently the first to use the
term "consensus" in this connection. During a 1955 Security Council
meeting to consider the Israeli complaints alleging attacks by Egyptian
forces, he said it was the "consensus of opinion" of the Council that no
new resolution was required since the matter was covered by previous
resolutions." More recently, it was by consensus that the Security Coun-
cil took the historic step of implementing Article 28(2) of the Charter
by finally arranging for so-called "periodic meetings."' 2
825 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 14, at 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1927 (1970).
'G.A. Res. 2632, 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/7992 (1970).
101 U.N. SCOR, 1st ser., No. I, at 172 (1946).
t1 10 U.N. SCOR, 698th meeting 25 (1955).
1225 U.N. SCOR, Supp. U.N. Doc. S/9824 (1970); 25 U.N. SCOR, Supp. U.N. Doc. S/9825
(1970).
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The Security Council's consideration of the problem of Namibia (for-
merly known as Southwest Africa) during 1970 illustrates the use of
consensus in place of a formal vote. In January of 1970, Ambassador
Jakobson of Finland, with the support of Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone,
and Zambia, sponsored Security Council Resolution 276 which created
an Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia. 3 Later referring to the report
of the Sub-Committee, Ambassador Jakobson remarked that it had:
put forward practical and substantive recommendations based on wide
agreement among its members. . . .The use of such sub-committees
may be worth considering in connection with other questions before
the Security Council. It could well be one method by which the work
of the Council could be made more effective.
The Sub-Committee recorded that:
After consultations among all members of the Security Council, the
President of the Security Council announced on 30 January 1970, that
the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee, established under operative paragraph 6
of the above resolution, would be composed of all members of the
Security Council. 4
Thus, like all the main committees of the General Assembly, it was a
committee of the whole.
After the Sub-Committee had elected the representative of Burundi
as Chairman and the representatives of Finland and Nepal as Vice-
Chairmen, the Sub-Committee determined that its meetings would be
closed, and that decisions would be taken by consensus, with the opin-
ions reflected in the report if differences arose. The vital point is that
there was to be no publicity, as in the usual open meetings of the
Security Council, and no vote, so that there was no possibility of a veto.
This procedural device of agreement by consensus was not unprece-
dented. At its 1506th meeting, the Security Council established a Com-
mittee of Experts, which met as a committee of the whole, to deal with
the question of the representation of "micro-States." On the other hand,
the Committee on Rhodesia 5 had limited membership until October 1,
1970, when it too became a committee of the whole. On July 31, 1968,
the President of the Security Council announced that the composition
of the Committee on Rhodesia would be Algeria, France, India, Para-
guay, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and
"
3S.C. Res. 276 (1970), U.N. Doc. S/INF/25, at 1 (1970). The report of the Sub-Committee is
in 25 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sept. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/9863 (1970).
"25 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/9632 (1970).
"S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23 Rev. 1, at 5 (1968).
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the United States. 6 When India's term on the Council expired on De-
cember 31, 1968, the President consulted the members of the Council
and then announced that Pakistan would replace India. 7 The terms of
Algeria, Pakistan and Paraguay on the Security Council expired on
December 31, 1969, and consultations were held on the reconstitution
of the Committee; it appeared that there was some desire to enlarge the
Committee. In April the President announced that until further decision
and without prejudice to the position of those who favored an enlarge-
ment, the Committee would be composed of the seven named states. On
September 30, 1970, the President of the Council informed the members
in a note that as a result of further consultations the Committee would
now be composed of all members of the Security Council. In his note
the President of the Council remarked that some members "expressed
certain reservations." But he was still able to state that the new compo-
sition "has now been agreed;" the "reservations will be stated for the
record at the next meeting of the Committee which will be called in
October." 8
The question of chairmanship required discussion. If it were a com-
mittee of the whole, should the President of the Council be the Chair-
man of the committee? The presidency of the Security Council rotates
every month according to the English alphabetical order of the names
of the members. The Committee of Experts on the problem of "micro-
States" decided to follow the practice of the Security Council with
monthly rotation. As already noted, the Sub-Committee on Namibia
elected its own Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen. 9 The Committee on
Rhodesia, which had its variations in membership, also varied its prac-
tice regarding its chairman. At the outset, on the basis of informal
consultations, it nominated its first two chairmen. After March 1969,
it decided that its chairmanship would rotate every two months in the
English alphabetical order. On May 21, 1970, however, it unanimously
agreed to extend the tenure of the representative of Nepal for two
months. Then in a note of September 30, 1970, the President of the
Security Council informed the members that consultations revealed
agreement "that the Chairmanship of the Committee should rotate
every month in the English alphabetical order according to the Presi-
dency of the Security Council."
Returning to the so-called Sub-Committee on Namibia, it persis-
123 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sept. 1968, at 71, U.N. Doc. S/8697 (1968).
1124 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1969, at 32, U.N. Doc. S/8697/Add. I (1969).
"125 U.N. SCOR, Supp. U.N. Doc. S/9951 (1970).
"See text p. 50 supra.
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tently distinguished between itself, as a committee of the whole, and the
Security Council as such:
[W]hile recognizing that it is the prerogative of the Security Council
to decide on any action with regard to Namibia, the Ad Hoc Sub-
Committee considers that it could best serve the Council by drawing
its attention to such proposals as would be likely to command suffi-
ciently broad support to ensure effective implementation."0
It further decided that:
[T]he report to the Council would contain any conclusions on which
the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee has been able to reach agreement, at the
same time as it would reflect the views expressed by members on
questions where such unanimity had not been reached."1
The Sub-Committee produced a draft resolution co-sponsored by its
chairman, the two vice-chairmen and the delegates of Sierra Leone and
Zambia. This resolution dealt generally with relations between South
Africa and Namibia. It also reaffirmed resolutions 264 (1969)2 and 276
(1970)3 whereby, inter alia, it recognized the decision of the General
Assembly to terminate the mandate for South West Africa and that the
presence of South African authority in Namibia was illegal and invalid.
The sponsors recognized that their draft resolution did not satisfy every-
one, but they believed it could be helpful. Other members acquiesced.
The Soviet representative voiced some objections in the Sub-Committee
and in the formal session mildly remarked that the draft resolution
cannot "be regarded as entirely satisfactory."24 The Soviet representa-
tive also said that he would support the resolution since the representa-
tives of the Afro-Asian countries who were members of the Security
Council considered it capable of contributing to a degree to the solution
of the problem of Namibia. 5
On July 29, 1970, the President of the Security Council, Ambassador
Sevilla-Sacasa of Nicaragua, put the draft resolution to a vote which
was taken by a show of hands." It was adopted with France and the
United Kingdom abstaining. Presumably the abstaining States wished
to have their positions recorded publicly, otherwise the President might
have announced adoption by "consensus."
225 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sept. 1970, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/9863 (1970).
211d.
"S.C. Res. 264, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24, Rev. 1, at 1 (1969).
2S.C. Res. 276, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25, (1970).
2425 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 13 (1970).
2id. at 14.
2Id. at 16.
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At the same session of the Security Council, Ambassador Jakobson
of Finland proposed a second draft resolution advocating a step which
the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee had mentioned-a request to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on "the legal conse-
quences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Nami-
bia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)." When
this draft resolution was submitted to the Council for its vote at the
same session, the representative of France requested a separate vote on
the phrase "notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). ' '27
On this proposal there was again a vote by show of hands and the phrase
was adopted by a vote of 11-0, with France, Poland, the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom abstaining. In the following vote on the resolu-
tion as a whole, France switched its vote to the affirmative so that it
was carried 12-0-3.28
Thus, the Security Council smoothly adopted two resolutions relative
to Namibia without any public evidence of strain or major disagree-
ment. Yet in the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee (of the whole) there was free
expression of reservations. These reservations are reproduced tex-
tually, 29 as are the verbatim records of the Security Council, although
the detailed records of the discussions of the Sub-Committee are re-
stricted documents not publicly distributed. The French representative
explained why France was not satisfied with the approach of the Secu-
rity Council to the solution of this problem. 0 Poland expressed reserva-
tions which it had voiced in the course of the Sub-Committee discus-
sions. " The Syrian delegation noted that as agreement in the Sub-
Committee was based on compromise, they would not oppose it.32 The
representative of the United Kingdom recalled the general position of
his delegation in connection with aspects of the South West African
question, but merely entered a "general reservation" to the report and
did not vote against either of the resolutions.3 3 The Soviet delegation
expressed its reservations at some length including the usual attacks on
the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and other Western powers 4.3 In making specific observations, it
2Id.
"The resolution as adopted is S.C. Res. 284, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25, at 4 (1970). This was the
first time in the 25-year life of the United Nations that the Security Council had exercised its right
to request an advisory opinion from the Court.
"Some of these reservations are printed in 25 U.N. SCOR Annex IV, U.N. Doc. S/9863 (1970).
3025 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 17-18 (1970).
31id. at 14.
"Id. at 10.
"Id. at 18-19.
3 Id. at 12-13.
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did not "on the whole object to the adoption of this draft report to the
Security Council.""
The procedures described here are not wholly novel, even in the expe-
rience of the United Nations. They do point to the advantage of infor-
mal private discussions and consultations conducted by a chairman in
contrast to the public debate where violent words and exaggerations are
the order of the day. While they do not signal the end of the veto in the
Security Council, they do suggest that, at least in some matters, prog-
ress can be made by adjustment and compromise. The President of the
General Assembly plays an important role by helping groups or sub-
committees hammer out texts which can be submitted to a plenary
session with some hope of adoption. The elaborate documents approved
at the close of the General Assembly's commemorative session on Octo-
ber 24, 1970, are excellent examples-particularly The Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations .36
"Id. at 13.
"G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), 65 A.J.I.L.
243 (1971). For a discussion of the Declaration see Rusk, The 25th U.N. General Assembly and
the Use of Force, 2 GA. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 19 (Supp. 1, 1972).
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